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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CLOVER D. CHRISTENSEN and 
THE WESTERN CASUALTY & 
SURETY COMP ANY, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
MARY V. LARSEN individually and as 
Guardian Ad Litem of SANDRA LEE 
LARSEN, a minor, MARY KAYE 
LARSEN, and INTERMOUNTAIN 
SERVICE, INC., 
Intervenors and Appellants, 
-vs-
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
11,135 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a declaratory judgment action to deter-
mine coverage under the automobile liability policy 
issued by the plaintiff and appellant, ·western Casu-
alty & Surety Company, and the defendant and 
respondent, Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
All of the parties above made motions for sum-
mary judgment and after argument and submission 
of memorandums of law, the trial court held that 
as a matter of law the automobile business exclusion 
in the policy issued by Farmers Insurance Exchange 
1 
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excluded coverage of the accident involving Clover 
D. Christensen and the deceased, Kurt E. Larsen 
that the plaintiff and appellant, Western Casualti: 
'-~ Surety Company, was primarily and solely respo1;. 
s1ble for coverage of said accident, and accordingiy 
the lower court granted a summary judgment to 
the defendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, and 
denied the motions for summary judgment of the 
plaintiffs and intervenol's herein. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the order and 
judgment of the lower court granting summary 
judgment in favor of the defendant and respondent, 
Farmers Insurance Exchange. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The uncontroverted facts in this case show that 
the appellant, Clover D. Christensen, on the 14th day 
of February, 1963, was operating a service station 
at 860 Third Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
that for some months previously he had had as one 
of his regular customers Dr. Vernon L. Stevenson, 1 
whose professional office was approximately thm 
blocks away from the service station. It was com· 
mon practice for Dr. Stevenson to request certain 
repairs and maintenance work to be completed. on 
his car by Christensen and to leave the accomphsh· 
ment of those objectives to the control and discre· 
ti.on of Ch1·istensen. Ordinarily Dr. Stevenson would 
deliver the car hi1rn;elf to the station, or Christensen 
2 
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would drive the car to his station from Dr. Steven-
son's parking lot, complete the work at his service 
station, and then return it to Dr. Stevenson's lot. 
Several days prior to the 14th day of February, 
1963, Dr. Stevenson had had a conversation with 
Clover D. Christensen, at which time Christensen 
suggested that Dr. Stevenson should have his front 
tires balanced which tires Christensen had sold to 
him previously. It was also recommended by Chris-
tensen that the tie-rod ends be replaced. 
On the 14th day of February, 1963, Dr. Steven-
son brought his car into Christensen's service sta-
tion, requested him to replace the tie-rods, balance 
the wheels, wash the car and fill it with gas. Dr. 
Stevenson continued onto his office. Several hours 
later Christensen drove the car from Dr. Stevenson's 
parking lot to his station where he commenced to 
complete the requested repairs and maintenance. 
Christensen intended to charge Dr. Stevenson the 
standard fees for such work. After having com-
pleted all of the other items of work, Christensen 
found that he was unable to balance the wheels inas-
much as his bubble balancer was broken and did 
not operate properly. Christensen did not notify Dr. 
Stevenson about his inability to accomplish the bal-
ance work, but decided on his own to complete the 
wheel balancing by taking Dr. Stevenson's car to 
the Phillips 66 Training Station, which was more 
than 45 blocks away from his station (Christensen's 
3 
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deposition on file herein in the case of Larsen rs. 
Christensen and Stevenson. Supreme Court No. 
10833, and Vernon L. Stevenson's affidavit, Record 
page 116). Christensen's purpose for taking the cai· 
to the training station was to do a good job for Dr. 
Stevenson since he was such a good customer. Chris-
tensen stated in his deposition from pages 21-22 (an 
exhibit herein which, however, is still on file as an 1 
exhibit in the case of Larsen vs. Christensen and 
Stevenson, Suvreme Court No. 10833, which is pres-
ently before the Court) : 
"Q. And then you started to do this wheel , 
balancing, and you say your machine was 
not functioning properly? 
A. Yes, that's right. 
Q. What was wrong with it if you know? 
A. 
Q. 
Well, it was one of the less expensive 
1 
machines, and it was what they call a 
1 bubble balancer. It was a little float bub-
ble in the top, and this bubble wouldn't 
center the way it should to balance the 
wheel. And he was a good customer ~f 
mine; I wanted to do a good job on h~ 
car; that's when I decided I better take it 
some place else to have these w.heels bal· 
ancecl. I didn't trust the machine. (Em· 
phasis ours) 
Did you talk with Dr. Steve_nson abo~t 
taking it outside of your stat10n for this 
work? 
A. No, I didn't." 
While driving the automobile to the Phillips 66 
4 
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Training Station, Christensen was involved in a col-
lision with a motorcycle driven by Kurt E. Larsen 
at the intersection of Tenth East and First South 
in Salt Lake City. At no time prior to this accident 
had Christensen ever provided services or mainten-
ance for Stevenson's automobile outside of his own 
service station, and at no time prior to the accident 
had Christensen asked Dr. Stevenson's permission 
to drive the car anywhere else other than to and 
from his service station and Dr. Stevenson's parking 
lot. 
Eventually, a lawsuit was brought by the pres-
ent intervenors against Dr. Stevenson and the plain-
tiff, Clover D. Christensen. In the pretrial in that 
case, the court dismissed Dr. Stevenson as a de-
fendant on the grounds that Christensen was acting 
as an independent contractor and not an agent. The 
defendant and respondent, Farmers Insurance Ex-
change, denied coverage in behalf of the appellant, 
Clover D. Christensen, on the grounds that the use 
of the Stevenson automobile by Christensen was in 
the automobile business as defined in its policy of 
insurance and was excluded under the terms of said 
policy. 
The appellant, Western Casualty & Surety Com-
pany, prior to the time of said accident, had issued 
a service station liability policy to Christensen cover-
ing any liability arising from the service station 
operation. Western Casualty in its reply to defend-
ant's requests for admissions admitted that its policy 
5 
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of insurance issued to Clover D. Christensen WM 
in full force and effect at the time of the accident 
( R. page 38). Western Casualty has provided a de-
fense to the wrongful death action brought against 
Christensen by the present intervenors. 
By bringing this ac:tion, the appellant, Western 
Casualty & Surel-y Company, is attempting to rele-
gate itself to the status of a secondary insurer, and 1 
the intervenors are attempting to secure additional 
insurance over that provided by Western Casualty, 
the service station insurer. 
As a result of the denial of coverage by the 1 
respondent, a declaratory judgment action was ini-
tiated into which the original plaintiffs intervened. 
All parties stipulated to the essential facts and made 
motions for summary judgment; and upon oral argu-
ment and submission of written memorandums the 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson held that the respond-
ent's motion for summary judgment should be 
denied (R. page 102). Subsequently, the court en-
tered an order holding that the use of the automobile 
by Christensen was within the distinctive definition 
of automobile business contained in the respondent's 
policy, thus excluding coverage under said policy 
(R. page 103). 
The respondent's policy provides as follows: 
"THIS POLICY DOES NOT APPLY UN· 
DER PART I: 
... (6) Vlhile the described automobile is 
6 
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being used in the automobile business, but this 
exclusion does not apply to the named insured, 
a resident of the same household as the named 
insured, a partnership in which the named in-
sured or such resident is a partner or any 
partner or employee of the named insured, 
such resident or partnership; .... " 
Under the definition in Part I, automobile business 
is defined as follows : 
"(2) AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS. 'Auto-
mobile Business' means the business of selling, 
repairing, servicing, storing, washing, deliv-
ering, testing or parking automobiles, their 
parts or equipment." (R. page 12) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS EXCLUSION 
AND DEFINITION WITHIN THE RESPOND-
ENT'S POLICY ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIG-
UOUS AND THEREFORE SHOULD BE CON-
STRUED ACCORDING TO THEIR PLAIN 
LANGUAGE AND MEANING, THUS DENYING 
COVERAGE. 
Respondent does not quarrel with the general 
proposition that an insurance policy will be con-
strued against an insurance company strictly where 
there are ambiguities, uncertainties, or doubt in the 
terms of the policy, Jorgensen vs. Hartford Fire 
Insurance Company, 13 Utah 2nd 303, 373 Pac. 2nd 
580 ( 1962) , however, respondent vigorously dis-
agrees with the propositions set forth in Point I of 
appellant's brief that a policy should be so construed 
as to afford coverage. Such statement is merely the 
ambitions of the appellants and is not a correct state-
7 
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ment of the law. It appears quite obvious that if the 
respondent's policy had merely excluded coverage 
while the car was being used in the automobile busi-
ness but then failed to define the automobile busi-
ness, an ambiguity possibly would occur; however 
' we are not faced with such a problem here inasmuch 
as the respondent's policy provides a clear and con-
cise definition of the words "automobile business" 1 
as it applies in that policy. The appellants would like 
to create an ambiguity by engaging in lexographic 
exaggerations which are not warranted in light of 
respondent's definitive policy exclusion which is 
more expansive than other automobile business ex-
clusions in that it adds these additional facets of 
the automobile business: washing, delivering, and 
testing. However, even the more restrictive version 
of the automobile business clause which was applied 
in the cases cited by the appellants has been specific-
ally held to be without any ambiguity. 
In the case of Walker vs. State Farm Mutual 
Auto Insurance Company, 190 N.E. 2nd 121, Illinois 
( 1963), the court was construing an exclusion clause 
identical with that in the respondent's policy except 
that it did not contain the three additional facets 
of the automobile business: washing, delivering, and 
testing. The court in the Walker case held that there 
was no ambiguity in the automobile business exclu-
sion clause, and therefore there was no basis to 
invoke the principle of resolving ambiguities in favor 
of the insured. The court further held that the use 
8 
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of an automobile in the various activities, which by 
definition constitute the carrying on of the automo-
bile repair business (i.e. selling, repairing, servicing, 
storing, and parking automobiles, their parts or 
equipment) was excluded from coverage under the 
policy. 
That conclusion is even more easily arrived at 
in the present case inasmuch as the clause in re-
spondent's policy specifically adds three major areas 
of use that a garage or service station makes of a 
car left in its custody by a customer: washing, de-
livering, and testing. Thus, quite obviously, a vehicle 
being operated within the functions enumerated is 
not covered by the policy. To read the automobile 
business exclusion and definition in any way other 
than what it clearly and precisely delineates by its 
own wordng would be an arbitrary and unwarranted 
destruction of the policy contract. 
POINT II. 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, STEVENSON'S 
AUTOMOBILE WAS BEING USED IN THE 
AUTOMOBILE BUSINESS AT THE TIME OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
Appellants in their Point II apparently are 
attempting to create a relevant distinction between 
"having cusody of" and "using" in order to conclude 
that Chrisensen had mere custody of the vehicle and 
thus the exclusion did not apply. Respondent respect-
fully submits that the appellants' statement that the 
question on appeal resolves itself down to the mean-
ing of the word "used" or the phrase "being used 
in" is a red herring, for in fact the sole question to 
9 
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be decided is whether the use of the car by Chris-
tensen came within the definition of automobile busi-
ness set forth in the respondent's policy. The appel-
lants assert that the exclusion refers only to use 
and not to identity of the driver, and that all cases 
are irrelevant that were cited under the older used 
exclusion whereby c0verage was not afforded where 
an automobile was being used by service or repair 1 
personnel within the service or repair operation. The 
appellants, however, overstate the difference between 
that exclusion and the automobile business exclu-
sion, for in any event neither of the exclusions become 
effective unless the particular vehicle was being used 
by a service station operator or repairman and with-
in the ambit of the service or repair operation. Thus 
the question under both exclusions resolves itself 
down to whether or not the use came within the 
prohibited activities as defined in the particular pol-
icy. The real difference between the two exclusion 
clauses is that the automobile business exclusion is 
more specific in defining the area of the excluded 
use and thus gets away from the charge that it is ' 
ambiguous. The statement by the appellants that 1 
the purpose for the word change by the insurance 
companies was to limit the coverage of the exclusion 
is pure speculation and is wholly without factual 1 
basis in this case. It is just as reasonable to conclude 
that the "automobile business" exclusion was meant 
to be more expansive that the old exclusion. 
Numerous cases construing the previously used 
10 
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exclusion are cited in 47 ALR 2nd 566, and an 
examination of those cases will show that courts 
were usually concerned with whether or not the 
particula1· use being made of the car came with-
in the sphere of the operations of the service 
station or repair shop. Under the automobile busi-
ness exclusion cases using a more restrictive defini-
tion than is contained in the respondent's policy, 
the courts have likewise been concerned with deter-
mining whether or not the use of the vehicle was 
within the spheres of the automobile business set 
forth in the particular policy's definitions. Quite 
obviously, some courts have found use of a vehicle 
under certain particular facts to be outside of the 
sphere of automobile business defined in the policy. 
These are the cases cited by the appellants in their 
brief; however, even these few cases are not incon-
sistent with the position of the appellants inasmuch 
as those cases are generally concerned with activities 
involving delivery or testing, which are facets of 
the automobile business not contained within the 
definitions in the policies there under scrutiny. How-
ever, had these policies had the definiton of auto-
mobile business contained in the respondent's policy, 
those courts would then have had the basis for apply-
ing the exclusion as did the trial court in the present 
case. The case directly in point is the case of Goforth 
vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 327 2nd 637 (CA 
4th, North Carolina), extensively argued by the 
appellants, where the court held that an accident 
11 
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which occurred while the customer's autombile was 
being delivered to him by the service personnel ilid 
not come within the automobile business exclusion 
which, of course, did not contain in its definition th~ 
facet of delivering as does the respondent's policy. 
The court in arriving at its decision made it clear 
that had the defiL~tion of automobile business in the 
policy included delivering as a facet of the auto-
mobile business, the result would have been different. 
The court said on page 618 in referring to what 
constituted the automobile business: 
" ... That business could, of course, include 
the transportation of motor vehicles to and 
from a garage for the purpose of repairing. 
No such meaning (i.e. transporting) is found 
within the definition, and it would have been 
easy to supply. The policy was wl'itten by All-
state and not by the additional insured Melton 
(service station opera tor) . Wherever ambigu-
ous, it should be read against the scrivener ... 
The omission to include transporting of auto-
mobiles along with selling, repairing, servic-
ing, storing or parking them is significant, 
and implies an intent not to enlarge the exclu-
sion." 
Thus, it appears quite clear under the Goforth case, 
which appellants rely upon, that coverage would have 
been excluded had the policy contained the definition 
contained in the respondent's policy. 
The point is unmistakable that the cases cited 
by the appellants do not shed light upon the problem 
now facing the Court inasmuch as every one of those 
12 
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cases contain a definition much more restrictive than 
that contained in the respondent's policy. We, there-
fore, turn to an analysis of the facts of this case in 
connection with this particular exclusion. 
Respondent contends that the judgment of the 
lower court is supported by either of two bases, the 
second of which is conceded by the appellants in their 
brief. First, that the use of the automobile by Chris-
tensen was a use within the service and repair facets 
of the automobile business; and secondly, that the 
car was in fact being used to secure equipment to 
facilitate the completion of the repairs, which appel-
lants concede on page 11 and elsewhere in their brief 
would be a use within the automobile exclusion. Tak-
ing the first basis of exclusion, we find various 
c:ases with analogous facts wherein coverage was de-
nied. In the case of Universal Underwriters Insur-
ance Company vs. Strohkorb, 137 S.E. 2nd 913, Vir-
ginia ( 1964), the owner of the car when desiring 
to have repairs completed upon it would take the car 
to the Bayside lot of the service and repair company, 
and from there it would be taken by an employee 
of the company to the repair garage at Virginia 
Beach. After the repairs had been completed, it would 
be returned to the Bayside lot and from there de-
livered to the owner. At the time of the accident the 
employee of the company was driving the car from 
the repair garage at Virginia Beach to the Bayside 
lot. The facts showed that such a service was offered 
to the customers for the purpose of increasing the 
13 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
company's business and retaining the goodwill of 
the customers. Universal Underwriters Insurance 
Company had issued a garage liability policy to the 
repair company, and United Services Automobile 
Assciation had issued an automobile liability policy 
to the owner of the automobile. A declaratory judg-
ment action was brought by Universal Underwriters 
against the automobile insurer to determine the obli-
gations of the two companies. United Services alleged 
in defense that coverage was excluded under its 
automobile business exclusion. The exclusion in that 
case was the automobile business exclusion which 
as pointed out previously is more restrictive than the 
respondent's policy. The court there held that the 
car was being used in the automobile business and 
that coverage was therefore not afforded under 
United Services policy. In doing so the court held 
that the use of the automobile at the time of the 
collision was "an integral part of the service offered 
customers for the obvious purpose of increasing busi-
ness." In the Strohkorb case the situation was not 
one of delivery to the customer, but rather was the 
use of the vehicle within its service operation, trans-
porting it to whe1·e the service and repair equipment 
was located. In the present case Christensen was 
making identical use of the car: driving it to another 
location to complete the repairs. The above-cited 
case of Universal Underwriters Insurance Compo 11U 
vs. Strohkorb, supra, also presents an additional ba· 
sis for excluding coYerage under the automobile pol-
14 
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icy where a ga1·age policy is also involved. In that 
case, as in the present case, the plaintiff in the de-
claratory judgment action was the insurer who had 
issued the service station policy, which policy provid-
ed essentially as does the appellant, Western Casual-
ty's policy that liability coverage is afforded for all 
operation necessary or incidental thereto to the ser-
vice station business and the use of an automobile in 
connection with such operations (R. page 6). The 
court observed that the insurer issuing the service 
station policy covered the use of the automobile at the 
time of the accident and resulting loss. The court 
then held that the scope of coverage for the service 
station policy was identical with that of the automo-
bile business exclusion in the automobile policy; and 
by admitting that its policy covered the use, the gar-
age insurer thereby admitted the application of the 
automobile business exclusion to such use. The court 
reasoned that the obvious purpose of the automobile 
business exclusion was to protect the automobile in-
surer from liability on the use of the car while under 
the sole and exclusive custody of the independent 
contractor servicing and repairing the automobile. 
The court stated in this regard: 
"Obviously, if the operation of the car by Pur-
due (garage employee) was a use in the auto-
mobile business of EmRhae Motors within the 
meaning of the insuring clause of U niversal's 
policy, it was a use in such automobile busi-
ness within the meaning of the exclusion 
clause of United's policy. The obvious purpose 
15 
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of ~he ex cl us~on clause in United' s policy is tfi 
reh_eve . the msurer from the very liabilitv 
which is covered under the terms of the ga1:. 
age liability policy of Universal. The risk 
u?der the two types of policies are obvious],~ 
different, and, no doubt, the rates are diffet:. 
ent." (page 915) 
Similar reasoning was set forth in the case of No. 
tionwide Mutual Insurance Company vs. Federal 
Mutual Insurance Company, 134 S.E. 2nd 253, Vir-
ginia ( 1964) , where the owner of a car sales agency 
was test driving a car he contemplated buying. Na-
tionwide had issued a garage policy to the agency, 
and Federal Mutual had issued an automobile lia-
bility policy to the owner of the car. Both companies 
denied coverage, and the judgment creditor sued 
both of them. The trial court found that the garage 
policy afforded coverage but that coverage under 
the automobile policy was excluded under the more 
restrictive automobile business exclusion. On appeal 
the appellate court affirmed the trial court's findings 
and held that the driving of the automobile was an 
important element in the business of selling automo· 
biles and that therefore the automobile policy did not 
apply. 
And in a case involving the same insurance 
company, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company 
vs. McAbee, 150 S.E. 2nd 496, North Carolina 
( 1966), the repair company had picked up the own· 
er's car at his residence took it to their shop, com· 
pleted the repairs, and while returning it to the 
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owner's home an accident occurred. Nationwide in· 
sured the car, and Federal Mutual had issued the 
garage policy to the repair shop. Nationwide con-
tained the more retrictive form of the automobile 
business exclusion. The trial court in the declaratory 
judgment action between the two insurance com-
panies held that Nationwide afforded coverage for 
the loss; and on appeal the trial court was reversed. 
The appellate court found that the returning of 
the automobile was part of the regular repair service 
offered by the repair company. (Emphasis ours) 
The court reasoned that the purpose of an automo-
bile business exclusion was quite logically to exclude 
coverage while in the custody of service or repair 
personnel, and that therefore any use arising out of 
that operation would be excluded. The court then 
made a direct attack against the Goforth case pre-
\'iously cited herein and others using similar ration-
ale. The court said : 
"The appellees cite cases holding that trans-
portation to and from a garage for repairs is 
not used in the automobile garage business. 
Among the cases is Goforth vs. Allstate Insur-
ance Company, 220 F. Supp. 616, a District 
Court decision. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, 
by per curiam decision, 327 F. 2nd 637, said: 
'We agree with the District Court that a priv-
ate automobile being driven from the place of 
business of the owner by a garage keeper to 
his garage for the purposes of affecting re-
pairs ... was not being used in the automobile 
business within the meaning of the exclusion 
clause in the owner's liability insurance pol-
icy.' The court attempted to justify the reason-
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ing by s?-ying the bu~iness of a. man driving 
the car did not deternune the busmess in which 
the.c?-r was being used whi~e.he drove it. The 
dec1s10n has been soundly criticized. The Fifth 
Circuit in Sanders vs. Liberty Mutual Insur. 
ance Company, 354 F. 2nd 777, rejected the 
theory advanced by the Fourth Circuit and 
held the exclusion did apply. The Goforth de-
cision holds the use w~xs not in the automobile 
business, therefore not insured by the garage 
policy but by the owner's policy .... " 
The court then held as a matter of law that the use 
of the owner's car by the repair company at the time 
of the accident was within the automobile business 
exclusion of Nationwide's policy. 
And in another case involving Nationwide Mutual, 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company vs. Ex-
change Mutual Insurance Company, 49 Misc. 2nd 
707, 268 NYS 2nd 495, a service station operator 
had received a request to come to the owner's resi· 
dence, pick up the automobile, drive it to his station, 
wash it, and then return it. After completing the 
washing and while returning the automobile to the ' 
owner, an accident occurred. The service station 
operator testified that the pick up-delivery service 
which he was performing was a free service, which 
he would perform for any of his customers if they 
so requested it. In this case the question was whether 
the returning of the car arose out of the operation 
of the service station. The court referred to the 
Goforth case and distinguished that case on the ha.sis 
that the court felt that the definition in the pohcy 
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was not broad enough to include transporting. The 
court held that this was not the situation in the case 
before it, since the exclusion clause there specifically 
stated that it excluded using the car with respect 
to any occurrence arising out of the operation of the 
service station. Likwise in the present case, the 
respondent's expanded definition so defines auto-
mobile business as to create a definition as expan-
sive as the definition in this case, touching the occur-
rences arising out of the operation of the service 
station. 
And in the case of Sanders vs. Liberty Mutual 
Insurance Company, 354 F. 2nd 777 (1965), the 
owner of the automobile drove to the service station, 
asked the operator to ride back to his home with 
him, and then drive the car back to the station to 
wash it. The accident occurred while the service sta-
tion operator was driving the car back to the station. 
The trial court granted a summary judgment in 
behalf of the automobile insurer who was claiming 
no coverage because of the automobile business ex-
clusion. The exclusion was the more restrictive ver-
sion of the automobile business exclusion. The plain-
tiff relied on the Goforth case. The court, however, 
rejected the reasoning of the Goforth case and held: 
"The policy by its terms, when reasonably construed, 
excluded the car from coverage when it was under 
the control of Sanders' employee driving the car to 
the service station to be washed." (Page 779). This 
court thus directly construed the exclusion as apply-
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ing to the u.se of the ~utomobile wh~le in the custody 
of the repair of service personnel m activities con. 
nected with the service or repair operation. 
And in the case of Walker vs. State Farm Mu,. 
tual Automobile Insurance Company, 190 N.E. 2nd 
121, Illinois ( 1963) , the repair shop owner took a 
car to another town to pick up some oil filters, and 
while on such trip ihe accident occurred. Stat€ 
Farm's policy contained the more restrictive auto-
mobile business exclusion clause. The trial court 
held that the exclusion did not apply. On appeal the 
trial court was reversed. The appellate court held 
that there was no ambiguity in the automobile busi· 
ness exclusion clause and further held that the opera-
tion of a repair garage includes all the various activ-
ities which together constitute the carrying on of 
its business, and since the activity in which the 
garage owner was engaged at the time of the acci-
dent fell within the terms of the exclusion, there was 
no liability under the policy. 
Thus, in the above cases coverage was excluded , 
under the automobile business exclusion on the ra· ' 
tionale that the use of the vehicle by the service 
or repair personnel in connection with the activities 
of repairing and servicing the automobile are ex· 
eluded. Thus, these cases have taken the reasonable 
approach that the words repairing and servicing in 
the definition mean what they say. In the present 
case the automobile was in Christensen's custody for 
the purpose of repairing and servicing the autD· 
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mobile, and the use of the automobile was directly 
within the service and repair operation inasmuch 
as it had not been completed and was being trans-
ported for the purpose of completing those repairs. 
To deny that the car was being used in the automo-
bile business would be a bald destruction of the 
clearly defined facets of repairing and servicing. 
Appellants in their brief attempt to completely 
emasculate any meaning from the repair and service 
facets of the automobile business by declaring that 
the word "use" would apply only to the operation 
of the vehicle within those operations as a tool or 
delivery vehicle. However, even an elementary 
knowledge of repair and servicing operations would 
immediately dictate that such an interpretation of 
the word "use" is unreasonable and unrealistic in 
that it is difficult to conceive of an automobile being 
used in a repair or servicing process other than while 
being driven for the purpose of facilitating the serv-
ice or repair operation. Appellants wish to create 
an exclusion that factually could never have appli-
cation, i.e. that the exclusion would only apply where 
an automobile is somehow being used to repair 
or service another automobile, which clearly is a 
strained and unwarranted interpretation of the ex-
clusion. 
It is abundantly clear from the cited cases that 
coverage is excluded where the automobile is being 
operated within the sphere of the repair and service 
operation. Add to this the respondent's definition of 
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automobile business, and any doubt is eliminated as 
to whether coverage of the automobile was intended 
to be excluded while used within the operations 
enumerated. Could the washing aspect have any 
meaning unless it applied to the customer's auto-
mobile as it was being washed or driven by the 
service personnel to accomplish that end? Obviously 
not. It is obvious to the respondent and was likewise 
to the trial court below that in order to ascribe any 
meaning to the respondent's definition of automobile 
business, coverage had to be excluded under the facts, 
of this case. 
The second base supporting the trial comi's 
decision in favor of the respondent is that the exclu-
sion would apply to the facts of this case under the 
appellant's interpretation of the scope of use in the 
automobile business. On page 8 of appellants' brief, 
they state: 
"Appellants, as a matter of policy interpreta-
tion, understand an automobile 'used in' the 
automobile business is one being used to sec~re 
parts. to obtain equipment, to obtain supplies, : 
to deliver equipment, to make repairs, to make : 
service calls, or an automobile engaged as a 
tool or item of equipment." 
As pointed out above, respondent contends that such 
interpretation tortures the obvious meaning of the · 
exclusion; however, assuming arguendo that appel· 
lants are correct in their interpretation, the facts 
here show that Christensen's use of the automobile 
was to secure parts and equipment, and to make re· 
pairs. Christensen had contracted to accomplish an 
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objective for a regular customer, to-wit: to balance 
the wheels at his place of business. After so con-
tracting, he discovered that his wheel balancer was 
inoperative. At that point, he had three alterna-
tives: he could get another balancer; he could get 
his balancer repaired; or instead of bringing a bal-
ancer to the car, he could take the car to a balancer 
that was working properly. Obviously, all three 
alternatives were equally connected with his com-
pletion of the service and repair operation on Steven-
son's automobile. When Christensen drove the auto-
mobile to the Phillips 66 Training Station, he was 
taking the automobile to the equipment rather than 
bringing the equipment to the automobile. Obvi-
ously, had he have driven his customer's vehicle to 
the training station, picked up a wheel balancer, 
and while driving the vehicle containing the wheel 
balancer back to his station to complete the work 
he was involved in an accident, coverage would 
be excluded under the appellants interpreta-
tion of the exclusion clause. The fact that the 
wheel balancer was not brough back to his sta-
tion in the vehicle does not change the use of the 
vehicle at the time of the accident, inasmuch as the 
fact still remains that the car was being driven to 
obtain the use of equipment which had become un-
available to him as his own station. It is interesting 
to note that on page 21 of the appellants' brief in 
referring to the above-cited case of Walker vs. State 
, Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, supra, the 
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appellants concede that in that case the car was being 
used to obtain a piece of equipment at a parts corn. 
pany in another town. Could the appellants reason. 
ably argue that had the car been driven to the other 
location and there the oil filter installed that the 
situation would have been any different? Again, 
respondent thinks not. The appellants' assertion that 
the use of the vehicle was merely an accommodation 
to the owner Stevenson is clearly rebutted by Chris. 
tensen's own statement in his deposition, as more 
particularly set out in the Statement of Facts in re· 
spondent's brief, that the purpose of the trip was to 
complete the repairs and maintain the goodwill of 
his customer (which obviously is an item of great 
worth in the service station business). 
The trial court should hardly be considered to be 
in error for holding that such use of a vehicle was 
for the immediate purpose of securing the equip· 
ment and means to complete his job, and thus putting 
the use within the automobile business exclusion. 
Respondent respectfully submits that in the cases 
cited by the respondent and the cases cited by the 
appellants there does not exist a factual situation 
which is so clearly within the automobile business 
as the case at bar, where under even the appellants' 
evidence it is established that the vehicle was being 
used for the benefit of the service station owner and 
to enable him to complete his contract with the 
owner. If such use does not come within the re· 
spondent's automobile business exclusion, it would 
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appear that the exclusion is completely without mean-
ing and effect. 
For the above stated reasons, respondent re-
ouests the court to affirm the judgment of the trial 
~ourt in granting the respondent's motion for sum-
mary judgment and in denying appellants' motions 
for summary judgment. 
POINT III. 
INASMUCH AS COVERAGE IS SPECIFI-
CALLY EXCLUDED UNDER THE FARMERS 
POLICY, THE APPELLANT, WESTERN CAS-
UALTY, IS THE SOLE AND PRIMARY IN-
SURER FOR ANY LIABILITY ARISING FROM 
SAID ACCIDENT. 
It is the position of the respondent that there 
is no coverage under the Farmers policy; however, 
should the Court get to the question presented in 
Point III of appellants' brief, respondent contends 
that the Court has no alternative other than to en-
force the pro-rata clauses contained in Western's 
policy and in Farmers' policy as set forth in the 
appellants' brief. The appellants refer to what they 
call the general rule as to excess and primary cover-
age; however, where both policies contain a pro-
rata clause, quite obviously the rights between the 
two insurers are thus to be determined pro-rata. 
In this connection see the annotation in 69 ALR 2nd 
1122, that where the policies purport to be excess 
the court has ordered pro-ration either on the policy 
limits or on some other equitable basis. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits to the Court 
that the trial court was correct in its conclusion that 
"As a matter of law at the time of said acci-
dent the use of the Stevenson vehicle by the 
plaintiff, Clover D. Christensen, was a use 
within the automobile business as defined in 
the defendant's policy of insurance, and there-
fore the automobile business exclusion applied 
to Christensen and coverage of any liability 
he may incur as a result of said accident is . 
excluded under defendant's policy of insur-
ance, and that the plaintiff Western Casualty 
& Surety Company is the sole and primary 
insurer of any liability Christensen may incm 
as a result of said accident." 
The distinctive automobile business exclusion 
contained in appellants' policy very clearly excludes 
coverage of a customer's vehicle being driven or 
otherwise used in connection with the functions 
enumerated in the definition. To find otherwise 
would be to negate completely the obvious intent and 
language of the policy. 
Equally as apparent is the fact that use of the 
vehicle by Christensen was within the service and 
repair operations and in addition to that was being 
used as a means to obtain equipment for the com· 
pletion of said repairs and service. Under the facts 
here the trial court had no alternative but to exclude 
coverage under this policy. 
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--
Respondent requests the Court to affirm the 
summary judgment granted in its favor. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & GARRETT 
By W. Brent Wilcox 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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